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The relationship between di￿erent levels of government, and their interac-
tions on the ￿nancial side, has been the subject of considerable scrutiny in
recent years. There are broadly two strands to this literature. The ￿rst ex-
amines the optimal assignment of public service provision and its ￿nancing
between di￿erent levels of government; this is the classic literature on ￿s-
cal federalism. Oates (1999) provides a survey of this literature. The ’tax
assignment problem’, and the degree to which decentralized states use in-
tergovernmental grants, tax sharing schemes, or sub-central taxes and user
charges, has been an important area of debate. A number of interesting issues
have been identi￿ed within this broad area, through studies that examine
how di￿erent levels of government deploy grants, share taxation revenues,
and react to changes in the balance between central government grants and
local revenues. For instance, a number of researchers have studied and in-
terpreted the so-called ’￿y-paper e￿ect’, whereby spending by lower levels of
government increases more markedly in response to increases in intergovern-
mental grants than in response to increases in local income (see Gramlich,
1977, Oates, 1994, Hines and Thaler, 1995). This has been further devel-
oped by studies which examine whether lower levels of governments react
di￿erently to increases and decreases in intergovernmental grants. Gramlich
(1987) suggests that such an asymmetry is present in US state and local
government behavior, but evidence to the contrary to this ’super-￿y-paper
e￿ect’ is presented in Gamkhar and Oates (1996).
A second broad strand relates to macroeconomic management in multi-
tiered governments. This literature is rather less developed, although it has
received recent attention from the OECD (see Journard and Kongsrud, 2003),
and in academic studies (see Triesman, 2000, Rodden, 2002 and Rodden and
Wibbels, 2002). This body of work emphasizes that the increasing tendency
towards decentralization and ￿scal federalism raises the issue of how to main-
tain sustainable public ￿nances. A number of industrialized economies have
adopted ￿scal coordination mechanisms to address this problem, as surveyed
in Journard and Kongsrud (2003). The mechanisms they discuss range from
formal sub-national ￿scal rules (e.g. expenditure and borrowing ceilings) to
informal coordination mechanisms. A key issue here concerns the incentives
faced by multi-tiered ￿scal authorities. For instance, the problem of ’soft
budget constraints’ faced by lower tiers of government has attracted con-
1siderable attention in some countries (e.g. Germany, Italy). Rodden (2003)
highlights how the possibility of cost-shifting can lead to expectations of bud-
get bailouts for the ￿scally weaker German Lander, and Bordignon (2000)
demonstrates that in Italy the decentralization of essential services (health)
has led to weak budgetary controls in the expectation of a central government
bailout.
Much of the empirical evidence on the way in which sub-central govern-
ments react to changes in central government policies has focused on indi-
vidual countries, especially the US. However, the contribution of sub-central
governments to attempts by central government to adjust their overall ￿scal
stance does seem to be an important issue in many OECD countries. In
Darby et al. (2004) we show that quantitatively, sub-central tiers of govern-
ment play a signi￿cant role in overall ￿scal consolidation attempts.
In this paper we focus on a natural experiment which allows us to ex-
plore how sub-central tiers of government react to major discretionary pol-
icy shifts at the central level1. We construct a panel dataset for the major
OECD economies and assess how central and sub-central expenditures, taxa-
tion, and intergovernmental grants change in response to attempts to correct
governments’ ￿scal positions. The episodes of ￿scal consolidation are identi-
￿ed using a methodology which has become standard in the macroeconomics
literature (see Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997, Alesina et al., 1998). We
then conduct event analyses on the panel of data, which allow us to exam-
ine the timing of expenditure, taxation and intergovernmental grant shifts
around the periods of ￿scal consolidation. Our analysis also distinguishes
between successful consolidations (i.e. ones that have a signi￿cant impact
on a country’s debt to GDP ratio) and unsuccessful consolidations, which do
not and show signs of being temporary. In addition to addressing some of
the above issues regarding the interactions between central and sub-central
tiers of government, we are also able to shed light on the extent to which
sub-central tiers of government participate in ￿scal consolidations, and hence
to macroeconomic adjustment. Finally, we switch the focus to cuts in grants
as a series of events, rather than ￿scal consolidations, and conduct event
analysis to examine how sub-central governments react to these grant cuts.
1Whilst it is di￿cult to analyse these issues in countries where the relationship between
tiers of government has changed over time, we do take steps to account for major shifts in
￿scal responsibility that have occurred during our sample.
2This allows us to assess the extent to which sub-central governments adjust
expenditures and use their own ￿scal powers (where these are signi￿cant)
to o￿set the cuts in their grant allocations. Finally, by grouping countries
or country characteristics in our event analysis regressions, we can examine
whether particular patterns of reaction to ￿scal consolidations or cuts in cen-
tral government grants, are particularly applicable to certain individual, or
groups of, countries.
Our paper highlights a number of points. First, successful ￿scal consoli-
dations at central government level bring with them similar, and sustained,
cuts in expenditure at the sub-central level. Indeed, in the case of success-
ful consolidation attempts, a pattern emerges for successful consolidations in
which central governments cut intergovernmental transfers to lower tiers of
government, who then make cuts in their expenditure since they have di￿-
culty in raising sub-central tax revenues. Our results do not appear to o￿er
strong support for the e￿ect identi￿ed by Gramlich (1987) in the USA: sub-
central governments do not tend to react to cut-backs in grants by raising
own source revenues signi￿cantly.
Second, unsuccessful consolidations tend to be characterized by tempo-
rary increases in taxation at the central level, with no reduction in intergov-
ernmental grants and no tendency for sub-central taxation to change. It also
appears that there is a strong correlation between success in consolidating
central ￿scal de￿cits and similar actions from lower tiers of government.
Third, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) identi￿ed cut-backs in capital
expenditures at central government level as a sign of an unsuccessful ￿scal
consolidation. In contrast, we ￿nd that where consolidations are successful,
sub-central tiers of government have to make signi￿cant cuts in their capital
expenditures. This suggests that the burden of adjustment to investment
falls onto lower tiers of government and that central governments worry less
about the long-term (i.e. public investment) consequences of consolidation
if these decisions are taken at local level. In addition, there is evidence that
when faced with cuts in intergovernmental grants during consolidations, sub-
central governments tend to maintain expenditures on wages at the expense
of capital expenditure: there seems to be a de￿nite switch towards public
consumption. This might be interpreted as a variant of the e￿ect identi￿ed
by Gramlich (1987): sub-central governments seek to defend current ser-
vices as opposed to spending on infrastructure rather than raising taxation.
This could be explained by the fact that in many of the OECD countries in
3our sample the states/regions and local authorities have much more limited
powers to vary taxation than in the USA.
Fourth, our results shed some light on how sub-central governments react
to cuts in grants and thus, at least indirectly, on the ’￿y-paper e￿ect’2, by
showing that it operates in reverse. It appears that successful ￿scal consoli-
dations are characterized by cut-backs in intergovernmental grants, which are
more than matched by cut-backs in sub-central expenditures. In contrast,
periods of unsuccessful consolidation, which are characterized by increases
in central taxation and no change in intergovernmental grants show only
a small temporary reduction in sub-central expenditures. We con￿rm the
robustness of this by looking at episodes in which central governments cut
back grants to lower tiers of government, in addition to periods of signi￿-
cant ￿scal consolidation. We ￿nd that this result is robust. Not only do
sub-central governments react to a cut in grants by cutting expenditures,
but remarkably those countries with structures that are more decentralized
and apparently involve greater ￿scal autonomy, tend to cut expenditures by
a greater amount, and seem reluctant to raise sub-central taxes. This re-
verse ’￿y-paper e￿ect’ might highlight either a low degree of e￿ective ￿scal
autonomy, or a high e￿ective degree of tax competition at sub-central level
which serves to limit any o￿setting increase in local taxation. This does seem
to contrast with the hypothesis that more decentralized ￿scal arrangements
lead to a lower degree of macroeconomic control (cf. Tanzi, 2001, Rodden,
2002, Rodden and Wibbels, 2002), or to excessive taxation (see Keen, 1997),
with the quali￿cation that central governments do retain a degree of e￿ective
control through their grant allocation decisions.
Finally, we ￿nd that the institutional arrangements in countries (the gov-
ernment type and the nature of the ￿scal arrangements) do impact at the
margin on the results. In particular, coalition governments tend to ￿nd it
more di￿cult to cut grants to sub-central governments during ￿scal consoli-
dation attempts.
2It should be stressed that originally (Gramlich, 1977) the term ’￿y-paper e￿ect’ was
used to describe the observation that the expenditure stimulus to local public expenditures
from unconditional grants was in excess of equal increases in private income. However,
since then, empirical studies (see e.g. Gamkhar and Oates, 1996, and Oates, 1999) have
associated the term ’￿y-paper’ with tests of the extent to which changes in government
grants impact on local expenditures without reference to changes in private income.
42 Fiscal Consolidations and Sub-Central Gov-
ernment
2.1 Scope of the Study
The data used in our study are annual and are taken primarily from the IMF’s
Government Financial Statistics (GFS), 2002 Edition, supplemented with
data from the OECD Statistical Compendium, 2002 Edition. GFS provides
the best internationally comparable data on ￿scal variables for ￿fteen OECD
countries that is disaggregated by tier of government3, subdividing these
between three levels (central, state and local categories). This allows us to
construct an unbalanced panel dataset with 336 observations covering the
period 1970-99. A full description of the data is provided in an Appendix.
The dataset covers not only federal, but also unitary countries. In practice,
as we show in Darby et al. (2003, 2004) the distinction between these two
categories in terms of the devolution of spending and ￿nancing arrangements
is not as clear-cut as one might think.
The dataset used does have some weaknesses. An obvious one is that little
or no distinction is made between tax revenues from taxes, where the sub-
central tiers control both the tax rates and/or the tax base, and revenues from
tax sharing arrangements. However, we have been able to supplement our
data to take into account the extent of independent taxing powers available
to sub-central tiers using OECD (1999) for the majority of countries and
information provided by Jonathan Rodden of MIT in the cases of Canada and
the USA. In our empirical work we use this additional data4 to distinguish
between countries in terms of their di￿ering degrees of ￿scal autonomy.
Another potential weakness is that, to the extent that central govern-
ment’s can exert in￿uence on sub-central spending patterns through direc-
tives (see Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002), GFS will overstate the true nature of
sub-central expenditure autonomy. Nonetheless, the GFS data remain the
best available for our purposes.
3Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA.
4Unfortunately, no such data appears to be readily available for Australia and France,
so in the extensions to the basic anlaysis that involve ￿scal autonomy data we have to
drop some sample observations.
52.2 Identifying Fiscal Consolidation Attempts
Previous studies of ￿scal consolidation attempts have tended to focus solely
on the general government (see Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997, Alesina et al.,
1998). In common with the existing literature, we de￿ne a ￿scal consolidation
as a discretionary attempt to improve general government ￿scal balances.
This of course involves abstracting from the e￿ects of automatic stabilizers
and interest payments, and focusing on the structural primary balance as
a proportion of GDP. There is no universally accepted way of decomposing
the primary ￿scal balance to GDP ratio into its cyclical and discretionary
components5. In what follows, we adopt the methodology used in Alesina and
Perotti (1995, 1997), and Alesina et al. (1998), who follow Blanchard (1993)
in using the constructed ￿scal impulses to measure discretionary changes in
￿scal policy from one year to the next.
For each country in our sample, we construct the Blanchard measure of
the ￿scal impulses by regressing each component of the primary balance on
unemployment, a constant, and a linear and quadratic time trend. Predicted
values for revenues and transfers are then calculated conditional on the pre-
vious year’s unemployment rate, and this allows one to calculate a predicted
primary balance based on an unchanged unemployment rate. The Blanchard
measure of the structural ￿scal impulse is then calculated by subtracting the
predicted cyclically adjusted primary balance from its actual value6.
Having constructed a measure of discretionary changes in ￿scal policy for
each country, there are two ways of proceeding. The ￿rst is simply to use this
measure as part of a cross country panel dataset to examine common features
which characterize shifts in general government discretionary ￿scal policy.
However, the problem with this approach is that the measured discretionary
￿scal impulse is unlikely to be zero even where there is no discretionary
policy action enacted by governments, simply because there is no perfect
way of decomposing automatic and discretionary ￿scal changes. The risk is
5For a discussion, see Gramlich (1990), Bouthevillain and Quinet (1999), Bruni and
Tujula (1999) and Chalk (2002).
6Bruni and Tujula (1999) compare the Blanchard measure of ￿scal impulses with a
cyclical adjustment of the primary balance that uses the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter. They
￿nd that the Blanchard measure corresponds more closely to periods of expansionary or
tight ￿scal stance as identi￿ed by economic commentators. It also has the merit of not
relying on somewhat arbitrary measures of potential output and base years.
6that any statistical analysis based on this panel dataset will lack statistical
power. A second way of proceeding is to focus on signi￿cant changes in
discretionary ￿scal policy. This will ensure that our results are not driven
unduly by cyclical changes. An operational de￿nition of a signi￿cant positive
￿scal impulse, i.e. a period of ￿scal consolidation is provided by Alesina and
Perotti (1995)7:
De￿nition 1: A period of ￿scal consolidation is deemed to have occurred in
a given year if the discretionary general government ￿scal impulse is
greater than or equal to 1.5% of GDP.
This de￿nition allows us to identify a number of consolidation episodes
from the panel data. These episodes can be classi￿ed further into successful
or unsuccessful. To be more precise, we again follow previous studies on
￿scal consolidation (see Alesina and Perotti (1995)) in de￿ning a subjective
criterion for the success or failure of a consolidation attempt, in terms of the
improvement of the general government ￿scal position8:
De￿nition 2: A ￿scal consolidation is deemed to be successful if, three years
after the consolidation attempt, the ratio of debt to GDP is at least
5 percentage points below the level observed immediately prior to the
consolidation attempt.
Having identi￿ed a number of periods of signi￿cant ￿scal consolidation,
we can analyze our data. As we shall see below, a useful approach is provided
by the methodology of event studies. Using de￿nition 1, we can identify 61
separate consolidation attempts9. Of these, using de￿nition 2, 22 seem to
have been successful. Table 1 reports the countries and date for which we
have identi￿ed ￿scal consolidation attempts. As might be expected, nearly
all (59 out of 61) general government consolidation attempts are either led
7For similar subjective criteria see Giavazzi et al. (2000), von Hagen et al. (2001).
8In practice, the results seem robust to di￿erent de￿nitions of ’success’, including the
use of a success index. For an application using a particular four point success index,
which makes a distinction between arresting the growth of debt, debt stabilization and
debt reduction, see Darby et al. (2004).
9We ￿nd that the identi￿cation of consolidation attempts alters little if we adopt al-
ternative methods to measure the discretionary ￿scal impulse based on application of the
Hodrick Prescott ￿lter or the OECD’s measure of the output gap.
7by central government or involve both tiers of government. There are only 2
cases in which the sub-central tier consolidated when no consolidation e￿ort
could be identi￿ed at the central tier.
2.3 Event Studies of Fiscal Consolidations
2.3.1 Econometric Methodology
Event studies provide a method, based on regression analysis, to examine
the collective time pro￿le of key time series variables of interest around the
time of de￿ned events, in our case ￿scal consolidations. These studies are
less common in macroeconomics, but are more commonplace in ￿nance10.
Here we use event study analysis to compare and contrast changes in key
￿scal variables before, during, and after a year of ￿scal consolidation, which
is the event of interest, with respect to ’normal’ or reference conditions, i.e.
non-consolidation years. By doing this, we can obtain a time pro￿le for each
of the ￿scal variables of interest both during the period of consolidation and
periods immediately prior to and following the ￿scal impulse.
In our analysis of ￿scal consolidations all the variables employed are ex-
pressed in percentages of GDP. We de￿ne each event window to comprise ￿ve
years, speci￿cally two years prior the ￿scal consolidation, the event period
itself, and the two years following the consolidation attempt. The width of
the event window can, as we shall see below, be altered if some of the time
dummies are not statistically signi￿cant in the relevant regressions.
The econometric methods used are similar to those employed by Tornell
and Westermann (2002) in an analysis of business cycles around the time
of ￿nancial crises. Panel data methods are applied, where the panel regres-
sions include ￿xed e￿ects to account for cross-country heterogeneity and use
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) to account for the e￿ects of heteroscedasticity11.
10See for instance MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997). For example, in ￿nance
these methods are used to examine the impact of ’news’, such as the announcement of
pro￿t ￿gures, on share prices in the immediate and surrounding periods.
11In a recent paper Bertrand et al. (2004) note that ’di￿erence in di￿erences’ estimates
might be a￿ected by the presence of serial correlation. Although our study does not
take a conventional ’di￿erence in di￿erences’ approach, it is possible that the presence
of serial correlation could result in inconsistently estimated standard errors. To explore
this issue in our context we conducted two robustness checks: ￿rst, we added a lagged
dependent variable to each regression; and second, we re-estimated our regressions using a
8Each ￿scal variable in our data set is regressed over the entire sample (for all
countries, i, and all time periods, t) on a series of time dummies designed to
capture the time pro￿le of the variables. More precisely, the coe￿cients on
the time dummies capture the di￿erences between each period in the event
window and non-consolidation years.
We carry out two sets of regressions. First we examine all consolidation
attempts collectively, where T denotes the actual year of consolidation:
yit = ￿i + ￿1Di;T￿2 + ￿2Di;T￿1 + ￿3Di;T + ￿4Di;T+1 + ￿5Di;T+2 + ￿1i;t (1)
where yit is the ￿scal variable of interest in country i at period t, and
Di;T￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the consolidation
period, and zero in all other periods.
Second, we subdivide the set of identi￿ed ￿scal consolidations into the
’successful’ and ’unsuccessful’ categories and perform the following regres-
sion:






















where again yit is the ￿scal variable of interest in country i at period
t, DS
i;P￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the success-
ful consolidation period (denoted t=P) and zero in all other periods, and
DU
i;Q￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the unsuccessful
consolidation period (denoted t=Q) and zero in all other periods.
Each estimated coe￿cient (￿k;￿k;’k) captures the estimated di￿erence
between period k in the event window and the average position in non-
consolidation years. Thus, for instance, if the dependent variable is the
annual change in central government expenditure, a signi￿cantly negative ￿2
GLS (Cochrane-Orcutt) estimator. In both cases we found only minor changes in the size
of the coe￿cients and no qualitative changes in the signi￿cance of the time dummies. We
continue to report the OLS estimates because of the di￿culty in plotting event windows
in the presence of lagged dependent variables. We are grateful to our discussant, Thiess
Buettner, for pointing this issue out to us.
9implies that in the year prior to the consolidation the change in central gov-
ernment expenditure was signi￿cantly lower than in non-consolidation years
(the ’normal’, or reference period).
As we shall see below, having estimated the standard event study regres-
sion it may be useful to see if individual countries or groups of countries
display signi￿cantly di￿erent behavior from the rest of the countries in the
event sample. For instance, we might wish to consider whether those coun-
tries with di￿erent types of central government (e.g. coalition or single-party
governments) display di￿erent behavior in terms of ￿scal adjustment at cen-
tral and sub-central level. Or we might want to consider if countries with
federal rather than unitary structures display a di￿erent adjustment pattern.
Equation (1) can be modi￿ed to incorporate tests of these hypotheses by
including an interactive dummy variable:
yit = ￿i + ￿1Di;T￿2 + ￿2Di;T￿1 + ￿3Di;T + ￿4Di;T+1 + ￿5Di;T+2 (3)
￿1ClDi;T￿2 + ￿2ClDi;T￿1 + ￿3ClDi;T + ￿4ClDi;T+1 + ￿5ClDi;T+2 + ￿3i;t
where Cl is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity in the case of
a particular country or group of countries and is equal to zero in all other
cases. The estimated coe￿cient on the interactive dummy variable captures
the additional e￿ect of this category of country over and above that identi￿ed
by the standard dummies. For instance, taking the previous example, if
Cl is a dummy representing the current Eurozone countries, a signi￿cantly
negative ￿3 would indicate that in the year of a consolidation attempt, central
government expenditure is signi￿cantly lower than in non-Eurozone countries
during ￿scal consolidations.
2.3.2 Results
The results of this consolidation event study are presented as a series of
graphs, shown in Figure 1, panels A to V. As noted above, we consider all
the consolidations which fall into de￿nition 1, and then sub-divide them into
the categories of successful and unsuccessful, using de￿nition 2.
The upper row of graphs in each panel shows the time pro￿le for the
￿scal variable of interest (e.g. ￿scal impulse, change in expenditure etc.)
10for respectively, all consolidations, successful consolidations, and unsuccess-
ful consolidations. Alongside the coe￿cients we also plot the standard error
bands which allow easy identi￿cation of the time periods in which the time
pro￿le implies a change which is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. The lower
row of graphs in each panel shows the cumulative change in the ￿scal variable
of interest, obtained by summing the respective coe￿cients over all periods.
Again, for the cumulative e￿ect we show asymptotic standard error bands.
Panel A shows the extent to which these consolidations involve an improve-
ment in the ￿scal position of the central government, as measured by the
annual change in the Blanchard ￿scal impulse. As can be seen from panel
A, ￿scal consolidations involve sizeable central government ￿scal impulses
in period T. It is also interesting to note that the time pro￿le of the con-
solidations around period T is very similar regardless of whether the ￿scal
consolidation is ultimately successful or not, but as can be seen from the cu-
mulative graphs, the successful ￿scal consolidations typically involve a larger
cumulative positive ￿scal impulse, as the improvements at time T are ampli-
￿ed in post-consolidation periods.
Panel B shows the discretionary ￿scal impulse implemented by the sub-
central tiers of government, and shows how they fared during these ￿scal con-
solidation attempts. It is interesting that the consolidation e￿ort is shared
between tiers of government. All period T dummies attract positive and
statistically signi￿cant coe￿cients, suggesting that the change in the discre-
tionary ￿scal balance is more favorable during consolidation years as opposed
to non-consolidation years12. Interestingly, we see that there is a major dif-
ference between successful and unsuccessful consolidations: in the former,
sub-central tiers of government share a considerable part of the burden of
macroeconomic adjustment. The other point to note is that in the period
following the discretionary ￿scal tightening there is a partial reversal at sub-
central level (the T+1 dummies are signi￿cantly negative). This may indicate
some resistance to the consolidation e￿ort.
Does a higher degree of ￿scal decentralization imply less control over ￿scal
policy at sub-central level? Rodden (2002) and Rodden and Wibbels (2003)
and Tanzi (2001), have argued that greater ￿scal decentralization might re-
sult in a potential deterioration in macroeconomic control, since sub-central
12Note that the movement in the sub-central impulse will also be a￿ected by any change
in grants from central government.
11tiers of government have the incentive to myopically focus on local issues.
Whilst we do not attempt to answer this question directly, we do examine
the extent to which the group of most decentralized countries contribute to
overall consolidation attempts, and gauge whether there is evidence of greater
resistance to central government consolidation e￿orts within such countries.
In Figure 1, panel C we have divided the sample into groups of countries
with ’high’ and ’low’ degrees of ￿scal decentralization. To be precise, we
divide our countries into these two categories on the basis of the percentage
of expenditure and revenue assigned to the sub-central tier. Eight countries
are allocated to the ’high’ category13. Figure 1 (panel C) shows clearly that
the average ￿scal impulse is larger in the ’highly decentralized’ countries at
time T. The improvement, relative to non-consolidation years, is as much as
0.5% of GDP. Thus, a high degree of decentralization does not seem to be
inconsistent with the sub-central tiers of government sharing the burden of
adjustment. As we shall see below, concurrent cuts in central government
grants appear to be an important element behind this shared adjustment.
Having looked at the time pro￿le of the overall ￿scal positions, we now
examine the evolution of total expenditures and revenues and their key com-
ponents during the event window. Note that, to avoid double counting, we
examine total expenditure de￿ned as total primary expenditure excluding
intergovernmental transfers (i.e. excluding interest payments and transfers
to other levels of national government). Similarly total revenue includes all
tax and non-tax revenues but excludes grants received from other tiers of
national government. Intergovernmental grants and transfers are analyzed
separately.
Panels D and E in Figure 1 show the evolution of central and sub-central
total expenditure during consolidation attempts. Panels F-M show the equiv-
alent plots for the components of total expenditure (respectively wages, social
transfer payments, goods and services and capital expenditure). A number
of points can be noted from these results. First, as can be seen from panels D
13The eight countries in the ’high’ category are Australia, Denmark, Canada, Germany,
Finland, Norway, Sweden and the USA, while the seven countries in the ’low’ category
are Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands. In addition,
we also di￿erentiated our sample along a related characteristic, whether the countries are
federal or unitary. In practice there is a substantial overlap between these two categori-
sations. The results for ’federal’ countries were similar to those for ’highly decentralised’
countries.
12and E, the key di￿erence between successful and unsuccessful consolidation
attempts is that the successful consolidations involve consistently tightened
expenditure over time, and not just in the period of the consolidation at-
tempt (T). Sustained cuts are evident in the majority of the components of
spending, with the exception of central government capital expenditure (see
below), and is also evident at the sub-central level, con￿rming the important
role of this tier. Second, it has been suggested by Alesina and Perotti (1997)
that cuts in social welfare spending and wages tend to distinguish success-
ful consolidation attempts; they stress the signalling e￿ect of these types of
cuts, through which central governments can demonstrate an important com-
mitment to ￿scal control14. Panels F and H con￿rm this: while signi￿cant
and sustained cuts are made in the central government wage bill across both
successful and failed consolidations, the size of the cut is clearly larger, and
the demonstration e￿ect stronger, in the successful case. Third, it is usually
argued (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997, and McDermott and Wescott, 1996)
that capital expenditure cuts tend to be unsustainable and hence are more of
a feature of unsuccessful consolidations. The plots in panels L and M show
that central governments tend to cut capital expenditure by more during un-
successful consolidation attempts, but this picture is reversed at sub-central
government. It appears that some of the ￿nancial pressure on sub-central
governments is translated into lower levels of public investment, and the
di￿erence between successful and unsuccessful consolidations is particularly
marked.
Turning to the revenues, Panels N-S in Figure 1 show the evolution of
central and sub-central government revenues and their components. Panel N
demonstrates a point made in Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) that in the
year of the consolidation unsuccessful attempts are characterized by increases
in ￿scal revenues rather than expenditure cuts. Note that central government
revenues rise in both successful and failed consolidation attempts, but that
the size of this increase is larger in the latter. However, the temporarily
higher level of revenues is almost completely reversed in the following year,
as indicated in the signi￿cant negative e￿ect at T+1. Thus the cumulative
change in the pro￿le of revenues is not actually di￿erent for successful and
14Alesina and Perotti (1997) also argue that outside of consolidation periods social
transfers and wages have a strong tendency to automatically increase. This is supported
by the average ￿xed e￿ects in our estimated model, for both wages and social trensfers
they tend to be positive.
13failed consolidation attempts. The temporary nature of the revenue hikes
is not readily evident from the Alesina-Perotti studies because their analy-
sis does not include the periods following the actual consolidation attempts.
Panel O shows that unsuccessful attempts seem to be characterized more by
an increase in sub-central governments’ revenues. Breaking down revenues
into taxation and other charges (including user charges), as shown in panels
P-S, one can see that there is a tendency for sub-central governments to raise
taxation15 in the period of the consolidation. There is also a tendency for
user charges and fees to be somewhat lower in the case of successful con-
solidations, although the di￿erence is barely signi￿cant. We conclude that
revenue adjustments appear to contribute little to the cumulative pro￿le of
￿scal consolidations at central or sub-central levels. Furthermore, where rev-
enue adjustments are present, they appear to be more likely to be associated
with unsuccessful consolidation attempts and/or to be temporary measures.
What seems to matter more, in terms of the success of ￿scal consolidation
attempts, is the role played by intergovernmental grants and transfers. Panel
T shows the extent to which central governments adjust sub-central grants
around the time of ￿scal consolidations. It is important to note that all the
countries in our sample exhibit some degree of vertical imbalance in that
expenditures at the sub-central tier exceed own-source revenues with the
di￿erence being ￿nanced by central government grants16. Any changes in
grants will therefore impact heavily on sub-central governments.
The signi￿cant negative parameters on the T, T+1, and T+2 dummies
in the upper row of panel T show that, relative to the reference category,
substantial cuts are made to sub-central governments’ grant allocations both
during and after consolidation attempts. It is also apparent that this result
is driven almost entirely by the experience of successful consolidations. The
cumulative change in grants during successful consolidations is about -1.3%
of GDP, while the average change outside the event window is 0.2%. In
contrast, the cumulative change is insigni￿cantly di￿erent from the average
￿xed e￿ect during unsuccessful consolidations. Clearly cuts in grants are
central to ￿scal consolidation e￿orts by central governments: by cutting the
￿nance available in e￿ect they force the hands of the decision makers within
15Although it should be remembered that we do not distinguish at this point between
taxation increases where the base and yield is under the control of sub-central government
and increases in shared taxation revenues.
16See Figure 4.
14the lower tiers of government. Below we will examine cuts in grants more
closely, to see whether, and when, sub-central governments respond to such
pressures by cutting expenditures, and when instead they choose to raise
taxes. For the moment, at least when we focus on ￿scal consolidations, there
would appear to be evidence of a reverse ’￿y-paper e￿ect’, in that cuts in
grants lead to cuts in sub-central expenditure. Again, we will return to
this theme below to see whether it applies more generally to all cases where
central governments cut grants to lower tiers of government.
Finally, we examine the extent to which the nature and stability of the
central government impacts on these ￿scal decisions. Using the data pro-
vided in Woldendorp et al. (2000), we di￿erentiate the identi￿ed consolida-
tion episodes along ’type of government’ lines. Although Woldendorp et al.
de￿ne six types of government, we choose to aggregate up to three classes:
single party parliamentary majority, coalition parliamentary majority and
parliamentary minority with a single party or a coalition). The form of gov-
ernment in the actual period of consolidation is used as the discriminating
factor17. Panels U and V of Figure 1 show, respectively, the annual change in
central government expenditures and cuts in grants made by single party and
coalition central governments. As can be seen in panel U, there is only a slight
di￿erence in the expenditure-cutting behavior of these types of government.
However, panel V demonstrates that coalition governments seem unable to
cut sub-central grants, while the single-party dummies are signi￿cantly neg-
ative at the 10% level. Cutting sub-central grants, like any other category of
current expenditure is likely to be politically di￿cult. Strong and less frag-
mented governments may ￿nd it easier to deal with the potential backlash
from local government. The reluctance to address sub-central ￿nances may
partially explain the lower probability of success in ￿scal consolidations of
coalition governments often discussed in the literature18.
17It is possible that changes in the type of government in power can take place within a
particular event window. In practice this happens only rarely in our dataset and has little
impact on our results.
18In addition, we have examined whether or not di￿erences in central government ide-
ology have an impact on the consolidation attemps by dividing our observations along
partisan lines (i.e. Left, Right and Centre). We found no signi￿cant di￿erences between
the groups and our results are available on request.
153 Cuts in Grants: How do Sub-Central Gov-
ernments React?
We saw in the previous section that when central governments engage in
￿scal consolidations they appear to use their grant allocation decisions as an
important instrument for controlling public ￿nances at the sub-central tier.
We now broaden our focus to ask how these cuts in grants impact on the
adjustment decisions made by lower tiers of governments. The reason for
doing this is that ￿scal consolidations may not be typical of a more general
tendency to adjust ￿nancial ￿ows between tiers of government. For instance,
in the previous section we saw that cuts in grants during ￿scal consolidations
were not accompanied by increases in taxation, but instead led to cuts in
sub-central expenditures (including capital spending). In other words, ￿scal
consolidation seems to diminish ￿scal decentralization. It is valid to ask
whether this result holds more generally, in a wider range of circumstances
not formally de￿ned by an attempt to restore the public ￿nances? Some
researchers have suggested for instance that changes in grant allocations can
be used to a￿ect the relationship between federal governments and states
(see Quigley and Rubinfeld, 1996).
3.1 A Cuts in Grants Event Study
In what follows we again employ an event study methodology in order to
study how sub-central governments react to cuts in their grant allocations.
Changes in grants as a percentage of total sub-central revenues now represent
the ’event’, rather than consolidation attempts. The variable in question is
the change in grants as a percentage of the previous period’s total revenue,
i.e. ((Gt ￿ Gt￿1)=TRt￿1) ￿ 100. Here, unlike in our assessment of consoli-
dation attempts, we focus on all real term cuts in grants, providing a total
sample of 86 episodes. We excluded two episodes, those relating to the UK
in 1990/91, and Spain in 1985/86. In both these cases the adjustments in
grants were linked to major reforms in local government ￿nance, and hence
did not represent independent attempts to change the ￿scal balance between
tiers of government without an associated reform in local/state government
￿nance. A list of all the episodes which are part of our sample is provided in
Table 2.
16As before, the basic event study regression is given as follows, where T
now denotes the actual year of the cut in grant:
yit = ￿i + ￿1Di;T￿2 + ￿2Di;T￿1 + ￿3Di;T + ￿4Di;T+1 + ￿5Di;T+2 + ￿4i;t (4)
where yit is the ￿scal variable of interest in country i at period t, and
Di;T￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period where
the cut takes place, and zero in all other periods. As before, we focus on
the paths followed by a number of key variables: total expenditure, taxation,
fees and user-charges, the wage bill, social transfers, expenditure of goods
and services, and capital expenditure.
Since grant cuts appear in the sample regardless of size we also divide
the events into two categories; ’large’ and ’small’ cuts in grants. These are
de￿ned below. We then perform the following event study regression:






















where again yit is the ￿scal variable of interest in country i at period t,
DL
i;P￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period when
the large cut in grants took place (denoted t=P) and zero in all other periods,
and DS
i;Q￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period in
which the small cut in grants took place (denoted t=Q) and zero in all other
periods.
As shown in (3), we can modify this regression to take account of partic-
ular individual or groups of countries to see if their behavior deviates from
that of other countries in the sample.
3.2 Results from Cuts in Grants Study
3.2.1 Results
One issue is whether there is some non-linear e￿ect present which cannot
be captured by focusing on all real cuts in grants. For instance, it might
17be possible, given a certain degree of ￿scal autonomy for a sub-central gov-
ernment to react to a small cut in grants by raising taxation, whilst a large
cut could not be accommodated in this way and might instead require a
signi￿cant cutback in spending. In order to check whether the results are
a￿ected by the size of the grant cut we divided our sample as shown in (5).
We ranked our sample of 86 observations by size and then divided them into
two equal sub-samples of ’large cuts’ and ’small cuts’19. The largest cuts
averaged 2.77% of total sub-central government revenues, whilst the smallest
cuts averaged 0.59% of total revenues. Note that both of these categories of
cuts are generally sustained. On average, the grants in period T+1 increase
by only 0.1% of total revenues for the large grants cut, and by 0.27% for
small cuts. In other words, large cuts are substantial and hardly reversed in
the following period, whilst small cuts on average tend to be partially, but
not wholly, reversed.
Another key issue is potential endogeneity and the causal link implied by
the event study. In this study we interpret cuts in grants by central gov-
ernment as exogenous and as causing reactions by sub-central governments.
However, if central grants were to adjust in response to the expenditure or
taxation decisions made by sub-central governments?20 Gamkhar and Oates
(1996) take account of potential endogeneity by instrumenting the cuts in
grants in their regressions. Clearly IV regressions are not appropriate to
event study regressions since the potentially endogenous variable, the cuts in
grants, do not actually enter the regression. The question instead is whether
19An alternative to dividing grant cuts into di￿erent categories is to scale the estimated
e￿ects of events by the magnitude of the events. Thus, one could run a regression of the
form:
yit = ￿i + (￿1Di;T￿2 + :::￿5Di;T+2)￿iT + ￿1i;t
where ￿iT is the size of the impulse of the grant change. We have experimented with
this approach, and have found that the predicted path for the ￿scal variables following
both an average ’large’ and an average ’small’ cut in grants is similar to those obtained
using the methodology outlined above. Clearly, more general forms of non-linearity could
also be investigated. However, one disadvantage of this approach is that it is di￿cult
to provide a concise graphical analysis of the results. For the current paper, we simply
note that these additional results support our initial conclusions in terms of a reaction
of sub-central governments to cuts in grants. We are grateful to our discussant, Dennis
Epple, for suggesting this potential extension.
20For instance, excessive sub-central expenditure or reductions in sub-central taxation
might lead to increases in intergovernmental grants.
18one should take account of potential endogeneity when determining when
exogenous cuts in grants have occurred. To check this, we have run auxil-
iary regressions using lagged grants and similar variables to the instruments
employed by Gamkhar and Oates (1996), to generate estimated exogenous
cuts in grants (using predicted rather than actual changes in grants). This
approach does lead to some minor changes in the episodes identi￿ed. How-
ever, a check of a number of the subsequent event study regressions indicates
little di￿erence to the estimated signs and sizes of the time dummy coe￿-
cients and their standard errors suggesting there is very little change in the
way sub-central ￿scal variables react to predicted as opposed to actual cuts
in grants21. In any event, even if one does not accept a strong causal link
for all the cuts in grants events identi￿ed, the event study can still be seen
as uncovering empirical regularities \stylized facts" that in some cases are
likely to be picking up causal e￿ects.
As before, we plot the results from the event study regressions to show
how the ￿scal variables for the sub-central governments behave in proximity
of the cuts in grants event. These are shown in Figure 2, panels A-G. In
each row of the panels in Figure 2 we again plot both the annual change
and the cumulative change in each ￿scal variable. Panels A-G show the
reaction of each of the seven ￿scal variables to the cuts in grants during the
event window, and for each variables the results are divided into all cuts in
grants, small cuts in grants, and large cuts in grants. In contrast to the ￿scal
consolidation event regressions, we ￿nd that the T-2 dummies are always
insigni￿cant in the grant cut regressions, and hence they have been dropped
from our regressions.
A number of points emerge from Figure 2. First, it is apparent from panel
A that there is a sustained cut in total expenditures at the sub-central level,
and there is even evidence that some of these cuts are anticipated since the
T-1 dummy variable is signi￿cant. This might be the result of planned or
signalled cuts by central governments. Second, as highlighted in panel B,
21To be precise, our instrumenting regressions regressed cuts in grants on some political
variables (political party in power, type of government using the data from Woldendorp et
al., 2000) as well as some conditioning economic variables (lagged unemployment, output).
We then used these regressions to idenitify predicted cuts in grants episodes, and used
these to re-run the event study regressions. The signs, sizes and standard errors of the
time dummies were very similar and hence accounting for endogeneity would not seem to
produce very di￿erent results.
19sub-central governments do tend to react signi￿cantly in period T to a cut in
grants, by raising taxation. Notice that, unlike the ￿scal consolidation study,
the estimated increase in sub-central tax revenue is signi￿cant at time T for
all grant cut episodes. The response of sub-central taxation revenues tends
to be immediate for large cuts in grants, and delayed (at T+1) for small
cuts, although it is notable that the cumulative change is more sustained
in response to small grant cuts. This is a richer picture than emerged from
our ￿scal consolidation study, where there seemed to be little impact on
revenues: although the cumulative e￿ect here is not signi￿cant by T+2, there
does appear to be a shift towards sub-central taxation as a result of cuts in
grants, with a delayed e￿ect in the case of small cuts in grants. However,
the impact on taxation is less than that on expenditures, and in general this
supports the notion that the ’￿y-paper e￿ect’ operates in both directions, in
that local governments choose not to fund certain expenditures if they have
to provide funds from their own taxes. This is generally supportive of the
results in Gamkhar and Oates (1996), and contrasts with Gramlich (1987).
Similarly, there is little evidence that non-taxation revenues from fees and
user charges are used to o￿set the cuts in grants (panel C). Third, the impact
of cuts in grants on the sub-central government wage bill is signi￿cant at time
T for all cuts, and there is a signi￿cant (though small) reduction in social
transfers and purchases of goods and services (see panels D-F). Following a
large cut in grants, the cut to the wage bill is large and signi￿cant at time
T and T+1, but the wage bill’s response is barely signi￿cant at time T and
never signi￿cantly below the starting point, even at T+2 in the case of a
small cut in grants. This might re￿ect the fact that large cuts elicit major
consolidations in sub-central governments such as adjustments in the wage
bill of local governments. Clearly in the case of social transfers any e￿ect
is small because the majority of social welfare expenditures are likely to be
the responsibility of central governments for most of the countries in our
sample, and this is similar across the size of grant cut. Overall the major
impact of the cuts in grants appears to fall on the sub-central government
wage bill, and this ties in with the evidence from our ￿scal consolidation
study, which suggested that sub-central governments play an important part
in stabilizations (see also Darby et al. 2004).
Fourth, as in the case of ￿scal consolidations, sub-central governments
appear to react to cuts in grants by cutting their capital expenditure. Panel
G demonstrates that cuts in capital spending constitute a large proportion
20of the overall adjustment, and that indeed the T-1 dummy is signi￿cant, so
that some cuts are brought forward ahead of the cuts in grants. Overall
the graph shows a substantial tightening across the event window, and this
is made even more signi￿cant by the fact that capital expenditure tends to
constitute a small proportion of total expenditure at the sub-central level.
Table 3 shows that capital spending ranges from as little as 6.24% of total
spending on average in Canada, to 28.7% in France. Our results also suggest
that small grant cuts account for more signi￿cant and sustained changes in
capital expenditure than do large grant cuts, a partial explanation for this is
that in the latter case the cut in spending appear to be temporary.
3.2.2 Dependence on Central Government Grants
One question which arises in analyzing these responses to central government
grant cuts, is whether there is a signi￿cant di￿erence in the responses of sub-
central governments which are highly dependent on grants and those that
depend less on grants. In Table 4 we have divided the sample into a small
group of ￿ve countries (the UK, Spain (post-1985)22, Belgium, Ireland and
The Netherlands) which exhibit a high degree of dependence on central grants
(above 50%) and the rest, where the dependence is less (below 50%).
Figure 3 shows the annual change in the ￿scal variables following a cut
in central grants, in each of panels A-G. What is striking about these re-
sults is that those countries that are least dependent on central grants seem
to cut expenditure more (i.e. there is a stronger reverse ’￿ypaper e￿ect’).
From the results in Figure 3, panel B, it appears that ￿scal autonomy23 does
not necessarily imply a willingness to o￿set grant cuts through increases in
taxes. Similarly, those countries that are less dependent on grants, are more
responsive in cutting all the components of spending (goods and services,
social transfers, wages, and capital expenditure).
This result suggests that cuts in grants elicit di￿erent reactions in di￿erent
institutional settings, although it is interesting to note that those countries
22Given that Spain underwent major reforms in the ￿nancing of sub-central governments
in the 1980s, we have divided the observations for Spain into two groups, those relating
to the pre-1985 reforms period, where Spanish sub-central governments depended less on
central grants, and the post-1985 period.
23Although one has to recall that some of those who are less dependent on grants do
bene￿t from tax-sharing arrangements (for example, Austria and Germany).
21that are least dependent on central government grants are more likely to
adjust. To check the robustness of this result, we conducted some further
analysis to check which countries and what institutional features were driving
this result.
3.2.3 Fiscal autonomy and Reaction to Grant Cuts
One way to examine how individual countries react during the events is by
introducing interactive dummies in our event study regressions (see 3). These
show whether individual countries display a behavior which is signi￿cantly
di￿erent from that of other countries in terms of the coe￿cient on the time
dummies in the regression. To put this another way, it shows whether the pro-
￿le of the ￿scal variables for individual countries evolves along a signi￿cantly
higher or lower path. In general, these results were not very informative,
and for some countries (Spain and Finland) there were too few observations
to allow us to introduce the country dummies24. Some consistent results do
emerge: for instance, Belgium shows a lesser cut in expenditure relative to
the reference value, Canada and the US display a smaller increase in taxa-
tion, and Austria and France showed a larger increase in taxation and higher
expenditure, following cuts in grants episodes. Germany and France also dis-
played a signi￿cantly larger cuts in capital spending, but Austria displayed
signi￿cantly smaller cuts, following cuts in grants. In the UK sub-central gov-
ernments seem to anticipate cuts in grants with bigger cuts in expenditure
at T-1.
In order to obtain more informative results, which use up less degrees of
freedom, we tried grouping the countries into di￿erent categories, depending
on the institutional features of their ￿scal arrangements.
Table 5 shows the ranking of the countries in our samples by expenditure
decentralization. A greater degree of decentralization in spending should
presumably allow sub-central governments greater scope to adjust to a cut
in grants. The ￿rst row of Table 6 shows that this does seem to be the case,
with taxation, total expenditures, and expenditures on goods and services
lower than the reference value25.
24These results are not tabulated for reasons of space. However, the results are available
from the authors on request.
25In tabulating these e￿ects we focus on the interactive dummies at time T. In some
cases, we found that the interactive dummies were signi￿cant in other time periods. How-
22We next attempted to see whether by grouping the countries by the de-
gree of taxation autonomy this might explain some of the reactions to the
cuts in grants. In order to do this, we use the measures of taxation auton-
omy published in OECD (1999) and Rodden (2002). There are, however, two
caveats with this. The ￿rst is that it results in the loss of observations for
two countries (France and Australia). The second is that the reference date
for these measures of tax autonomy (see Table 7) is ￿xed at 1995 levels. The
second row of Table 6 show that in fact few signi￿cant e￿ects could be found
at time T, so that tax autonomy does not appear to be a signi￿cant feature
explaining how sub-central governments react to cuts in grants. It is interest-
ing to know that a higher degree of taxation autonomy still involves a reverse
’￿ypaper e￿ect’ and that there is no attempt by sub-central governments to
o￿set the consequences of lower grants on sub-central spending.
Finally, we group the countries according to a measure of borrowing au-
tonomy (see Table 8). The ￿nal row of Table 6 shows that the countries
with the greatest borrowing autonomy react to cuts in grants through lower
total expenditure and lower capital spending, relative to the reference value.
It appears that, even for countries with high levels of autonomy, sub-central
expenditures and grants are strategic complements.
4 Conclusions
Our paper has established an important role for sub-central government in
￿scal adjustment. Using comparative data on sub-central government vari-
ables and on inter-governmental grants, we have provided a picture of how
sub-central tiers of government play a role during periods of ￿scal consoli-
dation, and how grants play a key role in forcing sub-central governments
to adjust. We use event study analysis to examine not only how govern-
ments react to these adjustment episodes, but also the time pro￿le of the
adjustment.
The results which emerge are varied and are set out in detail in the body
of the paper. However, it is worth highlighting three general points which
emerge from our empirical analysis. The ￿rst is that sub-central governments
play a key role in successful ￿scal consolidations. This provides support for
ever these e￿ects are di￿cult to explain in terms of institutional features in the country
groupings, and seem to be less important.
23the argument that understanding sub-central government behavior is impor-
tant in overall macroeconomic stabilization. However, this result is tempered
by the observation that ￿scal decentralization does not seem to necessarily
imply loss of control, as suggested by some observers (cf Rodden, 2002, Rod-
den and Wibbels, 2002), or to a higher degree of taxation (see Keen 1997).
Sub-central governments do not appear to react to ￿scal consolidation at-
tempts by increasing own taxes. Furthermore, the largest cuts in sub-central
expenditure in response to a cut in grants from central government, seem to
have occurred in countries with greater expenditure decentralization. This
implies that, even within countries which have high degrees of decentraliza-
tion, grant allocations provide a mechanism whereby central governments
retain considerable e￿ective control over aggregate sub-central expenditures.
In future work, we hope to focus more closely on the implications of al-
ternative forms of ￿scal decentralization and the level of e￿ective central
government control on the nature and success of consolidation attempts.
The second general theme is that we present some evidence that cuts in
grants play an important role in ￿scal consolidations. We also demonstrate
that cuts in grants are not generally o￿set by large and persistent increases in
sub-central taxation revenues. Overall, the increase in sub-central taxation
following episodes of cuts in grants tend to be weak, and this is generally
supportive of the presence of a reverse ’￿y-paper’ e￿ect, but without evidence
for an asymmetric ’￿y-paper e￿ect’ as suggested by Gramlich (1987).
The third general point is that capital spending is an important adjust-
ment mechanism for sub-central governments following ￿scal consolidations
or cuts in grants. Although the nature of the adjustment does depend on
the degree of success of the consolidation or the size of the cut in inter-
governmental grant, what is striking is that capital spending does tend to
su￿er at sub-central level following a ￿scal adjustment. This is despite the
relatively small size of capital expenditure compared to total sub-central bud-
gets, and possibly highlights a degree of short-termism on the part of local
governments in adjusting their ￿scal position.
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6 Appendix - Data Descriptions
All variables unless otherwise stated are from the IMF GFS [2002] database
and are in current prices.
1) Total Expenditure = [All Current Expenditure (including Wages and
Salaries, Employer Contributions, other Purchases of Goods and Services,
Subsidies, Transfers to households and Transfers abroad) less Interest Re-
payments less Transfers to other tiers of national government] + [All Capital
Expenditure (including acquisition of Fixed Capital Assets, Purchases of
Stocks, Purchases of Land and Intangible Assets and Capital Transfers) less
Capital Transfers to other tiers of national government.]
2) Total revenue = Tax revenue + Non-Tax revenue + Capital Revenue
+ Grants (total grants less grants received from other tiers of national gov-
ernment).
273) Tax revenue = Income, Corporate and Capital Gains taxation + Social
Security Contributions + Payroll taxation + Property taxation + Domestic
and International Indirect taxation.
4) Non-tax revenue = Entrepreneurial and Property Income + Adminis-
trative Fees and Charges + Fines and Forfeits + Other Non-tax revenue.
5) Grants = Grants received from other tiers of national government.
Grants received from super-national authorities such as the EU are excluded.
6) Social Transfers = Transfers to households and non-pro￿t organizations
+ Subsidies to ￿rms.
7) Government Wage Bill = Expenditure on Wages and Salaries.
8) Purchases of Goods and Services = Non-Wage Expenditure on Goods
and Services.
9) Capital Expenditure = Acquisition of Fixed Capital assets, Purchases
of Stocks, Land and Intangible Assets + Capital Transfers.
10) Debt to GDP ratio = Gross National Debt as a percentage of GDP;
source OECD Statistical Compendium 2002.
11) GDP = Gross Domestic Product (Expenditure approach) at current
prices; source OECD Statistical Compendium 2002.
12) Blanchard Fiscal Impulse = (Blanchard Adjusted cyclical balance)t
-Unadjusted Primary Balance)t￿1.
13) Type of government = Based on ’Type of Government’ variable in
Woldendorp et al. (2000). For each year, central government classi￿ed either
as single party majority (i.e. one party in government with a majority in
the legislature), coalition majority (i.e. two or more parties in government
where between the two they have a majority in the legislature), or minority
(i.e. single or multi-party government without a majority in the legislature).
14) Ideological color of the government = Based on "Ideological Complex-
ion of Government and Parliament" in Woldendorp et al. (2000). For each
year, central government classi￿ed as Right-wing dominance (share of seats
in Government and supporting parties in Parliament larger than 66.6%),
Left-wing dominance (share of seats in Government and supporting parties
in Parliament larger than 66.6%), Centre dominance (all other cases)
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Table 1: Chronology of Fiscal Consolidation Attempts 
 
  Year of Attempted Consolidation  Successful Consolidations 
 
Australia  1982, 96 & 98   1996 & 98 
Austria 1984  None 
Belgium   1982, 85, 86 & 94   1994 
Canada   1982, 87, 95, 96 & 97   1996 & 97 
Denmark  1983, 84 & 86   1983 & 84 
Finland   1976, 81, 84, 88 & 93   None 
France   1987 & 97   None 
Germany   1976, 77 & 82   None 
Ireland   1976, 83, 84, 87, 88 & 89   1987, 88 & 89 
Netherlands   1983, 85, 88, 91 & 93   None 
Norway   1981, 83, 89, 90 & 94   1981 & 94 
Spain   1985, 86 & 97   1997 
Sweden  1981, 82, 83, 84, 87, 92, 94, 95 & 96   1984, 87 & 96 
UK   1976, 77, 87, 88, 96, 97 & 98   1976, 77, 87, 88, 97 & 98 
USA   None   None 
Total   61   22 
 
Table 2: Chronology of Grant Cuts 
  Year of cut in grants  
USA 1983 
UK  1977, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 88, 93, 95, 97 & 98 
Austria  1985 & 89 
Belgium  1981, 82, 87, 88, 89, 92, 96 & 97 
Denmark  1981, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 95, 96 & 97 
France  1984 & 96 
Germany  1976, 77, 81, 82, 83, 93,94,95,97 & 98 
Netherlands  1980, 84, 86, 87, 89, 93, 94 & 96 
Norway  1977, 93, 95 & 96 
Sweden  1978, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 91, 94, 95, 96 & 99 
Canada  1980, 84, 86, 88, 93, 95, 96 & 97 
Finland 1993 
Ireland  1984, 86, 88, 89 
Spain 1997 
Australia  1982, 86, 87, 88 89, 94 
Total 88 
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Table 3: Sub-Central Capital Expenditure 



















Table 4: Ranking by Dependence of Grants: 
(grants as % of total sub-central revenues) 
 
  Table 5: Ranking by Expenditure Decentralization 
(s-c expenditure as % of total govt. expenditure) 
 
Countries with Low Grant Dependence    Least Decentralized Countries 
Spain (pre-1985)  18.56    Belgium  11.82 
Sweden 21.59    Spain  (pre-1985)  15.74 
Germany 23.25    France  16.93 
Canada 26.00    Netherlands  24.99 
Austria 26.11    Ireland  25.27 
USA 29.53    UK  25.37 
Finland 32.19    Spain    (post-1985)  27.83 
France 37.14    Austria  30.73 
Norway 37.41    Most Decentralized Countries 
Australia 44.82    Norway  33.63 
Denmark 45.64    Sweden  36.19 
Countries with High Grant Dependence   Finland  38.86 
UK 55.74    Australia 41.43 
Spain (post 1985)  56.42    Germany  41.77 
Belgium 57.87    USA  44.51 
Ireland 69.77    Denmark  45.01 
Netherlands 77.41    Canada  57.34 
 
Source for Tables 3-5: calculated as sample averages from IMF Government Financial Statistics.    31
Table 6: Summary of results using country groupings 
 
Criteria used for grouping countries 
 
 
Significant NEGATIVE effects 
 
Highest expenditure decentralization  
Total Expenditure 
Expenditure on Goods and Services 
Taxation Revenue 
 










   
 
Table 7: Ranking by Tax Autonomy 
      
  s-c tax  revenues as % 
of total s-c revenues 
 
(A) 
% of s-c taxation for 
which s-c controls tax 
rate and/or tax base 
(B) 
Tax Autonomy: 
‘own taxes’ as % of total s-c 
revenues 
(C) = (A) x (B) /100 
                                                                                                        Countries with greatest tax autonomy 
Sweden 61.47  100  61.47 
Canada 56.41  86  48.51 
Finland 49.53  89  44.08 
Denmark 43.75  95  41.56 
USA 47.46  76  36.07 
                                                                                                         Countries with least tax autonomy    
Belgium 34.25  97  33.22 
Spain 40.71  67  27.28 
UK 24.15  100  24.15 
Ireland 10.25  100  10.25 
Netherlands 7.12  100  7.12 
Germany 54.45  13  7.08 
Austria 51.21  11  5.63 
Norway 45.74  3  1.37 
Australia 32.88  N.A.  N.A. 
France 43.06  N.A.  N.A. 
Sources: Column (A) - IMF Government Financial Statistics, calculated as sample averages. 
Column (B) - Estimates for Canada and USA were provided by Jonathan Rodden and are based on 
control of both the tax rate and base, the remaining data are OECD (1999). All figures are for 1995. 
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Table 8: Ranking by Borrowing Autonomy 





Norway   1.6 
Ireland 1.75 
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FIGURE 1: 
A: Central Government Fiscal Impulse 
 
B: Sub-Central Government Fiscal Impulse 
































































































































































































































































































































   C: Sub-Central Fiscal Impulse split by level of decentralisation   
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  FIGURE 1 continued… 
D: Central Government Total Expenditure  E: Subcentral Government Total Expenditure 




































































































































































































































































































































































F: Central Government Wage Bill  G: Sub-Central Government Wage Bill 
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FIGURE 1 continued… 
H: Central Government Social Transfers 
 
I: Sub-Central Government Social Transfers 




































































































































































































































































































































































     Figure 1J: Central Government Expenditure on Goods and Services       Figure 1K: Sub-Central Government Expenditure on Goods and Services 
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FIGURE 1 continued… 
L: Central Government Capital Expenditure 
 
M: Sub-Central Government Capital Expenditure  









































































































































































































































































































































































N: Central Government Total Revenue   O: Sub-Central Government Total Revenue  





















































































































































































































































































































































          37
FIGURE 1 continued… 
P: Central Government Taxation Revenues 
 
Q: Sub-Central Government Taxation Revenues  




























































































































































































































































































































































































 R: Central Government Non-Tax Revenues   S: Sub-Central Government Non-Tax Revenues  
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FIGURE 1 continued… 
 
     T: Sub-Central Government Grants 



































































































































































U: Central Government Total Expenditure 
 
V: Sub-Central Government Grants 
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 FIGURE 2 
A: Sub-Central Total Expenditure 
 
B: Sub-Central Taxation Revenue 



















































































































































































































































































































































  C: Sub-Central Non-Tax Revenue   D: Sub-Central Wage Bill 
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FIGURE 2 continued: 
E: Sub-Central Social Transfers 
 
F: Sub-Central Expenditure on Goods and Services 






















































































































































































































































































































































G: Sub-Central Capital Expenditure       
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FIGURE 3 
 A: Sub-Central Total Expenditure 
 
   B: Sub-Central Taxation Revenue 
 
   C: Sub-Central Non-Tax Revenues 







































































































































































































































































































































































D: Sub-Central Wage Bill     E: Sub-Central Social Transfers     F: Sub-Central Expenditure on Gds & Svs 
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FIGURE 3 continued:           FIGURE 4 
G: Sub-Central Capital Expenditure          Vertical Imbalances: 





















































































































































































































      Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics. 
                                  Figures are sample averages. 
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